Forging a New Relationship with Nature:
Lessons from the Indigenous Philosophies of Abya Yala (América or the Americas)

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that we can draw on views held by certain strands of the Indigenous philosophies of Abya Yala (América or the Americas) to develop a sustainable relationship with nature. Unlike the dominant global North (Western) view, Indigenous philosophies of Abya Yala such as Náhuatl (Aztec or Mexica) philosophy conceive of the relationship between humans and nature as one of mutual dependency. I show that this asymmetry stems from divergent ontological and ethical views. To start with, whereas a substance ontology is a main component of the Global North conceptual framework, the Náhuatl conceptual framework is grounded in a holistic process-centered ontology according to which constant change is the basic principle of reality. I then show that this ontology informs a non-anthropocentric ethics of reciprocal cooperation between humans and nature. I conclude by showing why it is feasible for us, today, to embrace this conception of the relationship between humans and nature.

This article is part of the Philosophy in the Wild collection. It is based on work presented at the 2022 Philosophy in the Wild meeting in Ridley Creek State Park, Pennsylvania.

This article is also available as a PDF.

We live HERE on the earth (stamping on the mud floor)
We are all fruits of the earth
The earth sustains us
we grow here, on the earth and lower
and when we die we wither in the earth we are ALL FRUITS of the earth (stamping on the mud floor).
We eat of the earth
then the earth eats us.
Song sung by the Nahua people of San Miguel
Sierra del Puebla, Mexico (Carrasco 1995, 436)

This paper is intended as an invitation to consider some of the ways in which certain ontological and ethical views, held by certain strands of the Indigenous philosophies of Abya Yala (América or the Americas), can empower us to develop sustainable ecological praxes.1 Although I focus mostly on Náhuatl philosophy—the philosophy of the ancestral inhabitants of today’s central Mexico—I also allude to relevant aspects of Maya-Quiché philosophy—the philosophy of the ancestral inhabitants of Southern Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize—and Quechua philosophy—the philosophy of the ancestral inhabitants of multiple contemporary South American republics, especially Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador.2

I will start by laying bare some of the philosophical and metaphilosophical views that inform my approach.3 First, this paper is intended as a modest contribution to decolonizing environmental philosophy. As I conceive of it, the project of decolonizing philosophy has two main aims: to bring canonical Global North philosophy into dialogue with marginalized philosophical traditions, and to make our philosophical praxes responsive to the needs of marginalized or oppressed groups. In line with this decolonial approach, this paper is intended as a dialogue between the philosophical and metaphilosophical views that inform some Indigenous Abya Yala worldviews, on the one hand, and the metaphilosophical views of canonical Global North philosophers, such as J. L. Austin and John Dewey, on the other. More specifically, my approach is strongly influenced by Austin’s systematic criticism of canonical Global North philosophy’s reliance on clear-cut dichotomies that distort relevant facts (Austin 1962, 3; Moscarítolo Palacio 2022, 13). It is also influenced by Dewey’s (1917) insistence that philosophy must deal with real human problems, as opposed to mere problems of philosophers. Relatedly, this paper is informed by certain metaphilosophical ideas advanced by Afro-Caribbean and Latin American philosophers of liberation—especially by these philosophers’ insistence that the primary function of philosophy is to empower the oppressed to become the makers of their own liberation (Ellacuría 1985; Fanon 1963; Gutiérrez 1975; Mariátegui 1928; Schutte 1993). My target audience here therefore is not philosophers, or not philosophers qua philosophers, but people from all walks of life who want to rethink humanity’s relationship to nature and address environmental injustice.

Let us now look at the ontological views that inform the Indigenous philosophies of Abya Yala we are considering here. By “ontology” I mean the kinds of entities that a given people or culture take to exist, and the ways in which said people or culture take these entities to be interrelated (Kramm 2021, 1–3). The Nahuas subscribe to a monistic ontology: at the most fundamental level, they take reality to consist of a single entity, named Ometéotl.4 The Nahuas, then, view human and nonhuman animals, plants, stones, rivers, the stars, words, ideas, feelings, and so on as different modes of presentation, as different aspects, of this single cosmic energy. Náhuatl ontology is also pantheistic: everything that exists is sacred, given that everything that exists is Ometéotl and Ometéotl is sacred energy (León Portilla 2006, 110; Maffie 2015, 21–22). As some scholars have argued, the (pre-conquest) Mayas and the (pre-conquest) Quechuas also hold a monistic ontology. Whereas the Mayas name this vital energy Itz, the Quechuas use multiple names for it: Camaquen, Camac, Upani, or Amaya.5

These worldviews are also informed by a holistic process-centered ontology. Unlike the ontology of discrete and relatively enduring space-occupying entities with which we, in the Global North, operate in many ordinary and technical contexts, these Indigenous philosophies conceive of reality as a never-ending process. As J. Maffie puts it in Aztec Philosophy: Understanding a World in Motion, “there are no absolute beginnings—or absolute endings, for that matter—in Aztec metaphysics. There are only continuings” (2015, 24). For essentially identical reasons, Kinh, time, plays a central role in Maya-Quiché ontology, insofar as Itz, the cosmic essence, actualizes itself across time (McLeod 2017, 117–20). It should be noted, moreover, that Kinh is not a succession of cycles, since cycles have beginnings and endings. This becomes clear when one appreciates the centrality the Mayas accord to chum, the seating or nesting of one time period within another, given that chum is inconsistent with clear-cut beginnings or endings (McLeod 2017, 17). Similarly, one central aspect of Quechua ontology is the idea that Camaquen, Camac, Upani, or Amaya is always in flux (Maffie 2009, 10).

Another aspect of Náhuatl ontology that must be foregrounded is the centrality of agonistic inamic pairs, dualities whose terms stand in relations of constant opposition and mutual dependency.6 For any beings A and B that form an agonistic inamic pair, what A is is defined not merely by what A is by itself, but also by what B is and by the constant tug of war between A and B. It follows from this that ontological ambiguity is inseparable from the Náhuatl conception of reality (León Portilla 2006, 98–99; Maffie 2009, 15; 2015, 138ff; 2019, 12–13). An essentially identical notion of mutually complementary dual forces is central to Quechua ontology (Maffie 2009, 10–11).

An interesting instance of the Náhuatl notion of agonistic inamic pairs is the woman/man duality (Niles 1999, 318ff; Stone 1999, 297ff). For our purposes here, however, it is particularly relevant to zero in on the creator beings/humans duality. According to the Náhuatl creation narrative, the existence of the world is the result of the ongoing struggle among creator beings, the four sons of Ometéotl, “the dual principle” (León Portilla 2006, 94–95). Now, while the creator beings are more powerful than humans, they also depend on humans for their ongoing existence. Because creating and sustaining the world continuously depletes the creator beings’ vital energies, the ongoing existence of the world necessitates that humans in turn sustain the creator beings (Maffie 2019, 8–9).

We have seen that, because the Nahuas have a monistic conception of reality, they regard humans as merely another mode of presentation of the single sacred energy that makes up the world. At the same time, they believe that humans’ unique ability, and responsibility, to make possible the ongoing existence of the world sets us apart from the rest of the cosmos. In the Náhuatl world, being human is not regarded as an innate property or a property one acquires once and for all: one ceases to be human if one fails to work with others in sustaining the cosmos. This is why for the Nahuas humans are always striving to become human, and in some cases failing to do so (Maffie 2019, 11–12; Purcell 2017, 13–14). I wish to suggest, then, that one basic tenet of these philosophies from which we can benefit today is the idea that our privileged position in the cosmos comes with obligations to other species and the natural world more generally.

According to the Náhuatl worldview, tequitl, labor or duty, plays a central role in the ongoing process whereby reality actualizes itself.7 Now, in order to understand the ethical consequences following from this, we must foreground some aspects of the Náhuatl cosmology, of their account of the origin of the universe. Because of the strenuous labor that the creator beings continually perform to make possible the ongoing existence of nature, they continually require nourishment, particularly chicahualiztli, the vital energies of living beings—including humans—contained in their blood and hearts. The ongoing existence of the world, then, requires that humans perform tequitl as well: the reciprocal gifting that sustains the world (including humans) requires that humans continually offer their chicahualiztli to the creator beings.

This tequitl-centered ontology is, moreover, inextricably intertwined with a non-anthropocentric tequitl-centered ethics. For the Nahuas, a good life is one attuned to our actual situation on tlalticpac, the earth, which is “a slippery place,” so that a good life is one where one achieves neltiliztli< or rootedness—one where we are “rooted like a tree, as opposed to sliding about on our slippery earth” (Purcell 2017, 13). Now, because reality is an ongoing tug of war between agonistic pairs, achieving neltiliztli requires that we pursue tequitl. More precisely, given that we are part of a reality that is in constant flux, we lead a good life to the extent that we labor to maintain reciprocal relations with the cosmos (Maffie 2018, 1–8; Purcell 2017, 12–14).8

It follows from the monistic and holistic nature of Náhuatl ontology that the flourishing of individual humans is inextricably intertwined with that of other human and nonhuman beings. Similar views are held by other Indigenous peoples of Abya Yala, such as the Maya-Quiché. As we saw above, Kinh (time) is a key concept of Maya ontology, and as McLeod points out, “the primary significance of time is its ritual significance, which . . . consists in the human construction of the cosmos in cooperation with the rest of nature” (McLeod 2017, 14). As their political praxes attest, contemporary Maya communities subscribe to this view as well (De Miguel, T., 2022). An essentially identical view can be found in various North America (Turtle Island) Indigenous philosophies (Cajete 2016, 58ff; Deloria 2003, 80–81; Whitt 2004, 195–97).

Now, one might worry that the seemingly seismic change in our worldview which I am proposing—jettisoning our current substance ontology (of discrete beings) in favor of a holistic and process-centered ontology (and its attendant ethics)—is unnecessary, at best. A far less dramatic change from the markedly anthropocentric ethics systematically championed by mainstream European philosophy to a weaker brand of anthropocentrism—one that allows for more sustainable ecological practices without (entirely) doing away with the human/nature dichotomy—might be sufficient to bring about the requisite changes in our conception of, and our practical interactions with, nature. I take this to be a serious concern and one which I cannot even attempt to dispel in its entirety, partly because I do not believe that anyone can. As the two seemingly disparate traditions that inform my method here—the Latin American philosophy of liberation and J. L. Austin’s philosophy—teach us, we as philosophers ought to be mindful of the serious limitations of armchair philosophizing, particularly when it comes to predicting the practical success of deeply revisionary theoretical approaches. This is not to say, of course, that we cannot make any predictions whatsoever; rather, we ought to simply look at the facts—look for relevant actual instances (if any such instances do exist) in which this conceptual framework has been applied.

We don’t have to look very far, of course, since the pre-conquest Indigenous societies of Abya Yala developed sustainable ecological practices that were informed by the very ontology I am discussing here. And while it goes without saying that the sociohistorical situation of our (Global North) societies greatly differs from that of the pre-conquest Indigenous societies of Abya Yala, I cannot see why these glaring differences—in terms of economic, political, and social dynamics—would render a holistic and relational ontology ineffective for rethinking our relationship to nature. Let us consider the interaction between capitalism and the holistic and relational ontology we are discussing: it is precisely because the latter directly challenges basic tenets of the former—especially the radical individualism which lies at the very core of the capitalistic worldview—that the Indigenous ontological framework can play a uniquely powerful role in subverting aspects of a conceptual framework directly responsible for climate change. To put it slightly differently, in order to rethink our relationship with nature in a way that brings about a lasting, and truly effective, reconfiguration of that relationship—one which brings about truly sustainable ecological praxes—an indispensable first step is to do away with the isolationist character of our substance ontology. I submit that the Indigenous ontological framework we have been considering provides an alternative which is both theoretically cogent and practically promising, as a solution to the predicament at hand. Adopting a holistic and relational ontology is theoretically cogent because it is very hard to see how Global North polities can develop sustainable ecological praxes unless the members of these polities view themselves as being on the same boat with nature—unless they see human reality as being inextricably intertwined with natural reality. And it is practically promising because the ontological framework in question has a proven track record.9

Still, it might be retorted that the holistic and process-centered ontology being discussed here is so alien to us, members of contemporary Western (or, more precisely, Global North) socities, that it is unrealistic to expect that we can add it to our worldview. I think that this worry is unfounded. To start with, at the dawn of Western philosophy, Heraclitus famously adumbrated a process-centered ontology, summed up in the famous statement: “You cannot step twice into the same river, for other waters and yet others go ever flowing on. They go forward and back again.” (Haxton 2001, B49a). Moreover, a holistic and process-centered holistic ontology informs multiple Global South liberatory theories and praxes, such as the pedagogical theories and praxes resulting from the seminal work of Brazilian philosopher of education Paulo Freire (2005), as well as the democratized epistemology grounded in lo cotidiano, our everyday interactive processes, advanced by Latina feminist theorists and activists María Lugones (2003) and Ada María Isazi Díaz (1996). Even theories and practices strongly influenced by a substance metaphysics are beginning to embrace a holistic and relational ontological framework. For instance, in his encyclical letter “Laudato Si,” Pope Francis observes that “because all creatures are connected, each must be cherished with love and respect, for all of us as living creatures are dependent on one another” (2015).

At the risk of preaching to the converted, I want to end this proposal by reiterating a seemingly platitudinous point that has not sunk in at all: drastically changing our relationship to nature is the only viable solution to climate change. J. L. Austin maintained that “it is essential to abandon old habits of Gleichschaltung, the deeply ingrained worship of tidy-looking dichotomies” (1962, 3). Many of us concur, I think: we need to abandon oversimplifying dichotomies—such as the nature/human dichotomy—and genuinely appreciate the interconnectedness of the things that make up our world. We also need to come to terms with the fact that making the requisite changes will be hard. The Indigenous philosophies of Abya Yala, I submit, can prove a very valuable companion as we explore how to make these changes.

Notes

1. Following contemporary activists, as well as philosophical heroes of mine such as the late Argentine-US philosopher María Lugones, throughout this paper I use the ancestral term “Abya Yala,” coined by the Guna people—inhabitants of regions of today’s Panama and Colombia—to refer to the lands which colonial powers came to name “America,” and more recently “the Americas” (see, for instance, Lugones 2020, 29). I also use, in passing, the Spanish and Portuguese term “América”—which for centuries has been used to refer to the entire Western hemisphere—and contrast it with the more recent imperialist distinction between “America” (i.e., the United States) and “the Americas.”)

2. One might worry that treating all Mesoamerican Indigenous philosophies together, as I do here, does violence to them, insofar as this approach could be seen as obliterating the differences that exist between these philosophies. Now, as López Austin shows (on the basis of extensive anthropological evidence), Mesoamerican peoples share a common cosmovision or worldview (López Austin 1996, 473ff). A similar worry could be raised regarding the relationship between the South American Indigenous philosophies mentioned here and their Mesoamerican counterparts. Now, as López Austin shows, important structural similarities exist between the worldviews of Mesoamerican Indigenous peoples and those of their South American counterparts (López Austin 1995, 209–13). I am grateful to Matthias Kramm and Sebastian Purcell for raising this worry.

3. Morris Lazerowitz, who claims to have invented the English word “metaphilosophy,” defines it as an “investigation of the nature of philosophy” whose goal is to “improve our understanding of philosophy, what it is and how it works” (Lazerowitz 1970, 91).

4. Whereas León Portilla (2006) uses the term Ometéotl, Maffie favors teotl (2015, ch. 1).

5. In the opening paragraph of chapter 3 (“Worlds and the Question of Essence and Truth”) of his Philosophy of the Ancient Maya, A. McLeod notes:

I argue for the view that the Maya conception of the cosmos is monistic, rejecting the view advanced by a number of scholars that there are numerous transcendent realms represented by deities and other aspects of the Maya cosmos . . . A central concept linking all things in the cosmos, seen and unseen, is itz, which I interpret as both “essence” and “truth.” (2017, 99)

And, in his contribution to Blackwell’s Companion to Latin American Philosophy, J. Maffie notes:

Andean philosophy claims that the cosmos along with all its contents is vivified or animated by a single life force. In colonial-era documents, this life force is sometimes called Camaquen or Camac, other times, Upani and Amaya. Human beings, plants, mountains, water, wind, light, mummified human remains, textiles, and stone structures are infused with this force. It appears to be coextensive with existence as such. It is dynamic, flowing, and constantly circulating throughout the regions and inhabitants of the cosmos. Water, light, rainbows, and the human life-death cycle serve as conduits for its circulation and recycling. (2009, 10)

6. The Náhuatl word “inamic” can be translated as “something that squares with something else; its mate; his or her spouse.” Online Nahuatl Dictionary, ed. Stephanie Wood.

7. In Alonso de Molina’s pioneering Vocabulario en lengua castellana y mexicana y mexicana y castellana (1571), tequitl is translated as “tributo u obra de trabajo” [tribute labor or work]. In Horacio Carochi’s Compendio del arte de la lengua mexicana (1645), tequitl is translated as “tarea u obligación” [task or duty].

8. In this regard, Maffie maintains that

Mexica ethics . . . denies hardship has intrinsic value. Its badness and goodness are determined contextually. Mexica ethics maintains that hardship plays an essential and so indispensable role, as well as a creative and positive role in morally upright human behavior and in the well-lived, good human life. (2019, 8)

It’s hard to see, however, how hardship can both “play an essential and positive role” in the good human life and not be intrinsically valuable.

9. I am grateful to Sebastian Purcell and Matthias Kramm for raising this worry.

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Sebastian Purcell and Matthias Kramm for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, which significantly improved my argument. I would also like to thank Maja Sidzińska, Mike Gadomski, and Zach Agoff, organizers of the Philosophy in the Wild, for all their hard work and hospitality. Last but not least, I am very grateful to Russell Marcus, and to Hamilton College more generally, for their unwavering support.

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Contributor

Alessandro Ramón Moscarítolo Palacio (he/him) is the Chauncey Truax Postdoctoral Fellow in Philosophy at Hamilton College. Born and partly educated in Caracas, Venezuela, Moscarítolo Palacio is exploring ways to bring canonical European (or more precisely Global North) philosophy into dialogue with various marginalized traditions, such as the Indigenous philosophies of the Americas, Latin American philosophy, Afro-Caribbean philosophy, and philosophies of liberation. Moscarítolo Palacio’s interdisciplinary interests also include questions and problems in fields such as race and ethnicity, immigration, pedagogy, gender and sexuality, and public philosophy.

Review Statement

The PPJ supports Collaborative Community Review (CCR), an open peer review process rooted in transparency, community engagement, and ongoing developmental conversations. It is designed to shape scholarship so that it might effectively enrich public life and cultivate habits of responsiveness and collegiality among participants. CCR focuses on four style criteria: accessibility, relevance, intellectual coherence, and scholarly dialogue.

The following reviewers participated in CCR for this article:

Matthias Kramm https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2021-989X is a political and environmental philosopher and researches the Rights of Nature at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) in Mexico and at Wageningen University & Research (WUR) in the Netherlands. In doing so, he also addresses the question of the extent to which Western legal concepts are compatible with Indigenous philosophies. More information can be found at his website.

Sebastian Purcell is an associate professor of philosophy at the State University of New York at Cortland. He is also the director of the Honors Program and the coordinator of the Latinx and Latin American Studies program.

Citation

Moscarítolo Palacio, Alessandro Ramón. 2023. “Forging a New Relationship with Nature: Lessons from the Indigenous Philosophies of Abya Yala (América or the Americas).” Public Philosophy Journal 5, no. 2. https://doi.org/10.59522/SFHB7367.